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THE NEED FOR THE FEDERAL WIRETAP ACT TO 




The uses of Wi-Fi technology are progressing to the point where users 
may not fully understand the risks of operating on an unsecured Wi-Fi 
network.  Data and communications transmitted on such networks are 
prone to interception, and it is unclear whether the Federal Wiretap Act 
offers protection to users.  Conflicting provisions in the Federal Wiretap 




This paper examines the current Federal Wiretap Act and if it protects 
unsecured Wi-Fi communications.  An analysis of conflicting case law 
demonstrates that our courts are ill-equipped to take into account policy 
considerations; I will argue that Congress should step in.  A reading of the 
Communications Act and the Federal Wiretap Act together demonstrates a 
current lack of understanding of how to protect unsecured Wi-Fi 
communications.  This paper looks at users’ mistaken expectations of 
privacy in their internet communications that stem from a lack of 
understanding about the technology and a false sense of security.  I will 
also assess these laws under the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy analysis.  Finally, this paper advocates for the 
amendment of the Federal Wiretap Act so that it clearly protects unsecured 
Wi-Fi communications, meaning that such communications would not be 
interpreted to be “readily accessible to the general public.”
2
  Clear 
protections against the interception of unsecured Wi-Fi communications 
avoid possible private and social costs of data theft and compensate for 
users’ lack of technical knowledge and ability to protect themselves.  
  
 
*J.D., May 2014, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  Thank you to Professor 
Christopher Yoo of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and to student editors Anne 
Aufhauser and Andrew Morris for their helpful guidance.   
1
 28 U.S.C. § 2511 (2006). 
2
 Id. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, Google began its Street View program to collect street-level 
images of various locations.
3
  The service initially allowed users to access 
panoramic views of only five major U.S. cities, but since the platform’s 
launch, “almost a dozen countries around the world in North America, 
Europe and the Asia-Pacific region” are now accessible via Street View.
4
   
People are now able to see real pictures of a possible destination from the 
comfort of their homes.  After several years and iterations, Google now 
uses a fleet of cars, each of which uses fifteen lenses to take a three 
hundred and sixty degree photo.
5
  Each car also has motion sensors to track 
its position, a hard drive to store data, a small computer running the system, 
and lasers to capture three dimensional data to determine distances within 
 
 3.  Street View Car, GOOGLE STREET VIEW, 
http://www.google.com/intl/en_us/help/maps/streetview/technology/cars-trikes.html (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2013). 
 4.  Matt Williams, Behind the Scenes, GOOGLE MAPS UK, 
http://www.google.co.uk/maps/about/behind-the-scenes/streetview/ (last visited Jan. 5, 
2013). 
 5.  See Street View Car, supra note 3 (describing the camera technology used on Street 
View cars). 
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the Street View imagery.
6
 
In May 2010, Google admitted to having collected data from Wi-Fi
7
 
networks as part of the Street View project. Google claimed the purpose of 
this collection was to help Google establish users’ locations and provide 
location-based services.  However, Google also collected “payload” data—
the content of Internet communications—which included email and text 
messages, passwords, Internet usage history, and other highly sensitive 
personal information.
8
  Google maintained that it had only collected 
fragmented data from non-password-protected and unsecured Wi-Fi 
networks.
9
  However, in October 2010, Google admitted that “in some 
instances, entire emails and URLs were captured, as well as passwords.”
10
  
None of this collected information was publicly disseminated by Google. 
This admission raised serious concerns about privacy and potential 
violations of the Federal Wiretap Act (FWA)
11
 and Communications Act 
(CA).
12
  Google argued that unsecured Wi-Fi communications are excluded 
from the Federal Wiretap Act’s regulations because such communications 
are “readily accessible to the general public.”
13
  Both the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
investigated the scandal.
14
  The FTC closed its investigation, concluding 
that Google’s deletion of the material and revised privacy procedures 
sufficiently remedied the situation.
15
  The FCC took over the investigation 
 
 6.  See Street View Car, supra note 3 (referencing the technology that the Street View 
car utilizes to gather and store data). 
 7.  “Wi-Fi” is shorthand for “Wireless Fidelity” and is the current industry standard 
for most wireless data networks.  There are other important standards such as WiMax and 
Bluetooth.  A guide to Wireless Network Standards, PIXAVI 
http://www.pixavi.com/company-technology8-wireless-pixavi.html (last visited March 21, 
2013). 
 8.  Alan Eustace, WiFi Data Collection: An Update, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (June 9, 
2010), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/05/wifi-data-collection-update.html. 
 9.  See id. (explaining that Google had “been mistakenly collecting samples of payload 
data from open (i.e. non-password-protected) WiFi networks”). 
10.   Alan Eustace, Creating stronger privacy controls inside Google, Google Official 
Blog (October 22, 2010), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2010/10/creating-stronger-
privacy-controls.html. 
 11.  18 U.S.C. § 2510-22 (2006). 
 12.  47 U.S.C. § 605 (2006). 
 13.  In re Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc’ns Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1073 
(N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 14.  See Letter from Marc Rotenberg, Exec. Dir., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., to Julius 
Genachowski, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n (May 18, 2010), available at 
http://epic.org/privacy/cloudcomputing/google/EPIC_StreetView_FCC_Letter_05_21_10.p
df (noting that two senior members of the House Commerce Committee urged the FTC “to 
undertake an investigation and to reply to certain questions by June 2, 2010.”). 
 15.  See Letter from John Verdi, Dir., EPIC Open Gov’t Project, to Office of Gen. 
Counsel, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Feb. 11, 2011), available at 
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and, in April 2012, fined Google $25,000 for obstructing its investigation.
16
 
The FCC chose, however not to take any enforcement action with respect 
to the FWA or the CA.
17
  As of 2012, at least twelve countries have 




 Google’s accessing of data demonstrates the rising risks to private 
users’ Wi-Fi communications.  Many people who set up Wi-Fi routers 
choose to leave them open.  Such open Wi-Fi networks have become more 
popular with an increasing number of access points, known as “hotspots,”
19
 





 and airplanes.  Many people operate on such networks, 
which usually need a user to agree to the respective Terms and 
Conditions,
22
 without really realizing that these networks are “open.” 
This paper highlights the uncertainty of unsecured Wi-Fi 
communications protection when, at best, the FWA can only offer 
piecemeal protection.  Part I lays out the current state of wireless 
technology and provides the foundation for subsequent statutory 
interpretation.  Part II analyzes the FWA and CA separately and discusses 
current statutory interpretations of the provisions in tension.  Part II also 
explores how different courts have come to opposite conclusions on 
whether the FWA protects unsecured Wi-Fi communications.  Part III 
analyzes what it means to protect such communications when reading the 
FWA and CA together.  Expectations of privacy stem from users’ 
understanding of the technology, and a comparable Fourth Amendment 
analysis is offered as support that such expectations are reasonable.  
Finally, Part IV advocates ways to reform the FWA by clearly delineating 
 
http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/FTC_Streetview_FOIA_Appeal2.pdf (appealing 
administratively the FTC’s decision to close the investigation, believing that the FTC should 
have pursued the claim further). 
16.   Google Inc., 27 FCC Rcd 4012 (April 13, 2012) (Notice of Apparent Liability for 
Forfeiture) [hereinafter Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture]. 
 17. Id. 
 18.  Investigations of Google Street View, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, 
available at http://epic.org/privacy/streetview/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2012). 
 19.  See, e.g., XFINITY WiFi Hotspots, COMCAST, http://customer.comcast.com/help-
and-support/internet/about-xfinity-wifi-internet/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2013).  
 20.  See, e.g., AT&T Wi-Fi (United States), STARBUCKS, 
http://www.starbucks.com/coffeehouse/wireless-internet (last visited Dec. 29, 2012) 
(discussing Wi-Fi access at Starbucks). 
 21.  See, e.g., Journey with Wi-Fi, AMTRAK, http://www.amtrak.com/journey-with-wi-
fi-train-station (last visited Dec. 29, 2012) (offering Wi-Fi access to Amtrak train 
passengers). 
22.   See, e.g., Accept & Connect, STARBUCKS, 
http://www.starbucks.com/coffeehouse/wi-fi-auth (last visited Dec. 26, 2013) (requiring 
users to abide by the AT&T Terms and Conditions and Acceptable Use Policy).  
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how unsecured Wi-Fi communications should be protected by clarifying 
certain provisions of the existing statute. 
 
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY 
Wi-Fi allows electronic devices to exchange data wirelessly.  These 
devices operate using the common standards, collectively referred to as 
802.11 protocols, which are set by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (“IEEE”).
23
  The basic network setup consists of a Wireless 
Access Point (“WAP”), often referred to as a “wireless router,” which is 
typically connected to the user’s Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) network 
through a wired connection.  Communications travel from the WAP over 
radio frequencies to any device that is equipped with a Wi-Fi adapter, such 
as a laptop or smartphone. 
Although the FCC regulates most radio communications in the United 
States, Wi-Fi networks operate in the unregulated frequency ranges known 
as Industrial, Scientific and Medical (“ISM”) radio bands.
24
  Anyone can 
use this part of the radio spectrum without a license from the FCC.  Many 
devices such as microwaves, cordless phones, Bluetooth devices, and 
wireless garage door openers operate in one of the ISM bands.
25
  Wi-Fi 
networks use different frequency
26
 ranges of the ISM bands depending on 
the particular protocol being used.  Wi-Fi products are identified as 802.11, 
and are then further delineated by a lower case letter that identifies which 
specific technology is in operation.
27
  Each Wi-Fi network is configured to 
operate on a channel, which is a subdivision of one of the frequency ranges 
of the ISM bands.
28
 
Wi-Fi technology is increasingly used in our lives, with more Wi-Fi 
enabled devices entering the market
29
 and progressive Wi-Fi technology 
 
 23.  IEEE Computer Society, Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and 
Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications (2012), available at 
http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/802.11-2012.pdf. 
 24.  Patrick Butler and Austin Harney, A Smart Modem for Robust Wireless Data 
Transmission Over ISM Bands (433 MHz, 868 MHz and 902 MHz), 39 ANALOG DIALOGUE 
1, 1 (Mar. 2005), http://www.analog.com/library/analogDialogue/archives/39-
03/smart_modem.pdf. 
 25.  See id. at 1 (listing other devices that use ISM bands). 
 26.  Wi-Fi products operate in the 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz bands.  Discover and Learn, WI-FI 
ALLIANCE, http://www.wi-fi.org/discover-and-learn (last visited Jan. 2, 2013). 
 27.  The subdivision of protocols are 802.11a, 802.11b, 802.11g, and 802.11n, all of 
which operate in the 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz bands with different bandwidth data rates.  Id. 
 28.  802.11b WiFi Frequency Channels, MOONBLINK, 
http://www.moonblinkwifi.com/2point4freq.cfm (last visited Dec. 29, 2012). 
 29.  WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) and WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) are two 
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  When using Wi-Fi devices, users can protect their data 
through various encryption schemes.
31
  However, the user must manually 
enable these security mechanisms, or the Wi-Fi networks will operate in an 
open and unsecured mode.
32
  This tends to create a bias towards unsecured 
Wi-Fi networks, which may impede users’ privacy protection.  Users, 
however, are becoming more aware of the potential risks of an unsecured 
network thanks to numerous hacking incidents
33
 and many articles 
describing and encouraging the use of network security systems.
34
 
Interestingly, there are also many who advocate for more open 
wireless networks.
35
  One of the largest coalitions in this movement is the 
Open Wireless Movement, which advocates for open wireless networks in 
order to make the Internet more open and available.
36
  Offered benefits 
include increasing efficiency, boosting innovation and the economy, and 
bringing the Internet to those who cannot afford it.
37
  The group’s website 
 
different schemes, with the latter providing much stronger protection. Wi-Fi Enabled 
Devices, OPTIMUM, http://optimum.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/2421/~/wi-fi-
enabled-devices (last visited Dec. 29, 2012). 




(discussing one such technology, Long-Term Evolution (LTE)).. 
 31.  Ashley Poland, What is the Strongest WiFi Encryption?, HOUS. CHRON. 
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/strongest-wifi-encryption-66876.html (last visited Dec. 26, 
2013). 
 32.  Security, WI-FI ALLIANCE, http://www.wi-fi.org/discover-and-learn/security (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2013). 
 33.  Though unrelated to unsecured networks specifically, recent revelations that the 
National Security Agency collects meta-data may have also increased interest in secured 
networks and what information can be obtained from individuals.  Charlie Savage, N.S.A. 
Often Broke Rules on Privacy, Audit Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2013, at A0, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/16/us/nsa-often-broke-rules-on-privacy-audit-shows.html; 
see also, e.g., Tim Bradshaw, Hackers embarrass Apple with data leak, FINANCIAL TIMES, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/effd1712-f6af-11e1-827f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2H7aG42k8 
(noting that a hacker group allegedly obtained data about Apple product users by hacking 
into an FBI laptop). 
 34.  See, e.g., MOONBLINK, supra note 28 (illustrating how certain Wi-Fi channels can 
enhance a wireless security system). 
 35.  For example, numerous cities and municipalities are offering free wireless access.  
See, e.g., Phillip Dampier, Binghamton To Expand Free Wi-Fi in Downtown Region – 
Encourages Residents to Share Their Connection, STOP THE CAP! (July 22, 2009), 
http://stopthecap.com/2009/07/22/binghamton-to-expand-free-wi-fi-in-downtown-region-
encourages-residents-to-share-their-connection/ (documenting the expansion of free Wi-Fi 
in the town of Binghamton); Wi-Fi (Wireless Internet), CITY OF PONCA CITY, OKLAHOMA, 
http://www.poncacityok.gov/index.aspx?NID=417 (describing the free Wi-Fi service 
offered in Ponca City, Oklahoma) (last visited Jan. 2, 2013). 
 36.  OPEN WIRELESS MOVEMENT, https://openwireless.org/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2013). 
 37.  Id. 
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seeks to dispel myths that an open wireless network is a security risk by 
encouraging users to educate themselves about further security measures 
they can take.
38
  Such tools include personal firewalls, Virtual Private 
Networks
39
 (VPN), Secure Socket Layer
40
 (SSL), and Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol Secure (HTTPS) to reduce the risk of compromised privacy.
41
 
II. PRIVACY FOR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 
The United States Constitution does not explicitly provide for the right 
to privacy, though the Supreme Court has recognized it in many 
amendments, guaranteeing that the government will refrain from intruding 
in private speech, religion, homes, and thoughts.
42
  The Fourth Amendment 
is analyzed in Part III.B in more detail, though it is important to note that 
this doctrine only applies to government searches and that courts have 
found that it provides little privacy protection to technological information 
exposed to the public.
43
  The Supreme Court typically addresses issues of 
privacy on a case-by-case basis where new technologies create new privacy 
problems.
44
 Historically, the Court has been slow to respond to such 
problems.  With respect to technology, privacy law has evolved to define a 
 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  VPN technology uses public unsecured network infrastructure to provide secure 
access to private networks.  Usually, VPN technology is used to provide remote offices or 
individual users with access to their organization’s work.  Roger Cheng, Lost Connections, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119717610996418467.html. 
 40.  SSL is the standard security technology for establishing an encrypted link between 
a web server and a browser.  FAQ: What is SSL?, SSL.COM, available at 
http://info.ssl.com/article.aspx?id=10241 (last visited Jan. 4, 2013). 
 41.  See, WI-FI ALLIANCE , supra note 32 (listing the different security measures that 
can be used to maintain privacy on the Internet). 
 42.  U.S. CONST. amend. I–V. 
 43.  See infra Part III.B for an analysis under the Fourth Amendment. 
 44.  See, e.g., Hank Greely, The Supreme Court, New Technologies, and Privacy—
Another Case of Approach/Avoidance, SLS BLOG (Jan. 23, 2012), 
http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/lawandbiosciences/2012/01/23/the-supreme-court-new-
technologies-and-privacy-%E2%80%93-another-case-of-approachavoidance/ (noting the 
Court’s tendency to “approach answering questions . . . but then back off them” in United 
States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012)); Nicole Greenstein, Privacy and the Law: How the 
Supreme Court Defines a Controversial Right, TIME.COM (July 31, 2013) 
http://nation.time.com/2013/08/01/privacy-and-the-law-how-the-supreme-court-defines-a-
controversial-right/ (discussing the Supreme Court’s approach to five previous privacy 
cases);  Kashmir Hill, Supreme Court Justices Concerned Abourt Pervasive, Technology-
Enabled Government Surveillance, FORBES.COM (Nov. 8, 2011, 1:30 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/11/08/supreme-court-justices-concerned-
about-pervasive-technology-enabled-government-surveillance/ (discussing the arguments in 
United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012)).  
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reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz v. United States.
45
 No 
expectation of privacy exists, however, where a communication is 
disclosed to a third party.
46
  Finally, the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act
47
 of 1986 (ECPA) which was enacted a year after Katz, 
requires a balancing of the individual’s privacy needs with the needs of law 
enforcement.  Congress enacted the ECPA to “meet the constitutional 
requirements for electronic surveillance” enunciated in Katz.
48
   
In addressing privacy concerns for electronic communications, the 
FWA and CA should be read together.
49
  The FWA was enacted in 1968 
and was amended by the ECPA in 1986.
50
  The CA was enacted in 1934 
and amended in 1968 to cross-reference the FWA.
51
 
A. The Federal Wiretap Act 
The FWA has been famously resistant to interpretation.
52
  The statute 
has an interlocking set of prohibitions, definitions, and exceptions that 
defies facile comprehension.  Congress, in enacting the FWA in 1968, was 
primarily concerned with the live surveillance of telephone conversations 
and electronic eavesdropping.  The statute focused on regulating law 
enforcement and investigation techniques to combat crime, though it also 
 
 45.  389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 46.  United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
 47.  18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006). 
 48.  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 532 (1985) (citing United States v. U.S. Dist. 
Court for E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 300 (1972)). 
 49.  The House Report stated that the “Committee has drafted the present Act [18 
U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.] with an eye to its interplay with Section 705(a) of the 
Communications Act of 1934.”  H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 41 (1986). 
 50.  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Statutes, JUSTICE INFORMATION SHARING, 
https://it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area=privacy&page=1284.  
 51.  Google Inc., 27 F.C.C.R. 4012, 4014 (2012). 
 52.  See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that 
the FWA is “a complex, often convoluted, area of the law”); Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. 
United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 1994) (calling the ECPA “famous (if 
not infamous) for its lack of clarity”); Briggs v. Am. Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 415 (5th 
Cir. 1980) (commenting on the court’s desire to have “planted a powerful electronic bug in a 
Congressional antechamber to garner every clue concerning Title III” to aid in “the 
troublesome task of an interstitial interpretation of an amorphous Congressional 
enactment”); Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression 
Remedy Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 820 (2003) (stating 
that the “law of electronic surveillance is famously complex, if not entirely impenetrable”); 
Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1264, 1292 (2004) (“[The ECPA contains] a myriad of different terms with complicated 
definitions. The statute zigzags with dozens of cross-references. . . . [I]t contains at least 
seven different legal threshold requirements for government surveillance . . .”). 
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regulated private conduct in the same realm.
53
  Much scholarship has also 
focused on the statute’s role in regulating government surveillance.
54
  
Whether the FWA protects all unsecured Wi-Fi communications is unclear.  
While the statutory language is not specifically aimed at protecting 
unsecured Wi-Fi communications, the laws nevertheless could be applied 
to Wi-Fi communications.  
The FWA defines liability based solely on whether the privacy of 
communications has been breached, and not, for the most part, on what 
information was obtained, who obtained it, or how it was used.  Regulation 
under the FWA is binary:  permitted actions are not subject to any 
regulation whatsoever
55
 and prohibited actions are a potential felony and 
subject to statutory damages of $10,000 per violation.
56
  The FWA 
prohibits intentionally intercepting
57
 or disclosing wire, oral, or electrical 
communications, except under certain exceptions.
58
  Courts have 
interpreted “intercept” to mean an acquisition of a communication 
contemporaneous with transmission.
59
  The original version of the act 
before 1986 only protected wire and oral communications.
60
  The addition 
of “electronic communications” as a form of protected communications in 
1986 covers “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, 
 
 53.  S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 70 (1968) (“The major purpose of title III [of the Federal 
Wiretap Act] is to combat organized crime.”). 
54.  See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Spyware and the Limits of Surveillance Law, 20 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1283, 1287 n.11 (2005) (stating that modern surveillance statutes were 
primarily passed to address the legality of government surveillance activities under the 
Fourth Amendment); Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (2007), available at http:// stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/freiwald-first-
principles.pdf (contending that a four factor test should be used to assess whether statutes 
“implicate Fourth Amendment concerns about intrusive government investigatory 
methods”); Kerr, supra note 51, at 807 (stating that unless Congress clarifies statutes “[t]he 
government’s compliance with the Internet surveillance laws will remain unexamined.”). 
 55.  This is in contrast to many other privacy regulations that govern based on social 
context, the judgments of reasonable people, detailed administrative regulations subject to 
discretion in enforcement, or more finely graded scales of potential damages. 
 56.  18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(4)(a), 2520(c)(2) (2006). 
 57.  The structure and legislative history of the FWA suggest that interceptions must, at 
some level, be accomplished by a person. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2006) (“‘[I]ntercept’ means 
the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication 
through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.”). 
 58.  18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006). 
 59.  United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1047 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
accessing or retrieving stored communications, not in transit, falls under the regulation of 
the Storage Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006)).  Interception of such 
communications is not within the scope of this paper. 
60.   18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006) (“Title III originally covered only ‘wire’ and ‘oral’ 
communications but was significantly revised by Title I of the ECPA in 1986 to include 
electronic communications.”).  
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or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, 
radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects 
interstate or foreign commerce . . . .”
61
  Data that is transmitted over a Wi-
Fi network uses radio signals, placing such electronic communications 
within the provenance of the FWA.
62
 
The FWA provides a set of exceptions to the broad prohibitions placed 
on the interception of electronic communications.
63
  The provision 
applicable to Wi-Fi communications is as follows: 
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter or chapter 121 of 
this title for any person . . .  – 
to intercept or access an electronic communication made through 
an electronic communication system that is configured so that 




In applying the law to its collection of personal data over unsecured Wi-Fi 
networks, Google claimed that its actions fell under this exception because 
unsecured Wi-Fi communications are “readily accessible to the general 
public.”
65
  The terms “readily accessible to the general public” and 
“configured” are key to understanding this exception.  The definition of 
“readily accessible” is provided in subsection 2510(16) of the FWA: 
(16) “[R]eadily accessible to the general public” means, with 
respect to a radio communication, that such communication is 
not— 
(A) scrambled or encrypted; 
(B) transmitted using modulation techniques whose essential 
parameters have been withheld from the public with the intention 
 
 61.  18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2006). 
 62.  See generally In re Pharmatrack, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that 
transmissions of completed online forms to a website constitute “electronic 
communications” under the FWA); Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1047 (holding that information 
transmitted by a computer virus falls within the meaning of “electronic communications” 
under the FWA); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that website content is included in the definition of “electronic communications” 
under the FWA because the information is transmitted from the website to the user via a 
server, which is one of the specified mediums within the FWA) . 
 63.  Most of these exceptions do not apply in the case of obtaining payload data from an 
open and unsecured Wi-Fi network.  For example, one exception is when there is permission 
for an electronic communications provider’s agent to intercept communication “in the 
normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary 
incident to the rendition of his service.”  18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2006).  Another 
exception is if one of the parties to the communication gives consent to the interception or if 
the person intercepting the communication is acting under the “color of the law.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2511(2)(c) (2006). 
 64.  18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (2006). 
65.   Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, supra note 16. 
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of preserving the privacy of such communication; 
(C) carried on a subcarrier or other signal subsidiary to a radio 
transmission; 
(D) transmitted over a communication system provided by a 
common carrier, unless the communication is a tone only paging 
system communication; or 
(E) transmitted on frequencies allocated under part 25, subpart D, 
E, or F of part 74, or part 94, of the Rules of the Federal 
Communications Commission, unless, in the case of a 
communication transmitted on a frequency allocated under part 
74 that is not exclusively allocated to broadcast auxiliary 




The legislative history clarifies that:  
[radio] communications are considered readily accessible to the 
general public unless they fit into one of the five specified 
categories . . . . Thus, the radio communications specified in [the 
then-]proposed subsection 2510(16) are afforded privacy 
protections under [the FWA] unless another exception applies.
67
   
The question here is whether this definition of “readily accessible to the 
general public” applies to electronic communications. 
1. “Readily Accessible” 
Subsection 2510(16)’s definition of “readily accessible” with respect 
to “radio communication,” does not clarify whether Wi-Fi 
communications, as electronic communications, can benefit from the 
exception in subsection 2510(16).  However, subsection 2510’s opening 
language, “As used in this chapter,” implies that 2150(16)’s definition of 
“readily accessible” should apply wherever the term appears, unless the 
definition was explicitly confined to specific subsections.
68
  If the 2510(16) 
definition does not apply, the term “readily accessible” will be left without 
any statutory definition with respect to electronic communications 




If subsection 2510(16)’s definition of “readily accessible to the 
general public” applies to Wi-Fi communications, then whether such 
communications were secured would determine whether Wi-Fi 
 
 66.  18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) (2006). 
 67.  S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 14-15 (1986). 
 68.  18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006). 
69.   Id. 
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communications would receive protection.  Therefore, secured Wi-Fi 
communications would fall under 2510(16)(A)’s “scrambled or encrypted” 
provision, and thus the “readily accessible to the general public” exception 
would not apply and such communications would be protected.  Whether 
unsecured Wi-Fi communications would receive protection is unclear. 
Protection for unsecured Wi-Fi communications could fall under 
subsection 2510(16)(E).  A plain reading of subsection 2510(16)(E) 
indicates that at least some communications over certain Wi-Fi radio 
frequencies—allocated under parts 25 and 94 and subparts D, E, and F of 
part 74 of the FCC rules—do not fall under the “readily accessible to the 
general public” exception.  The Senate Report states that the scope of this 
provision includes “satellite communications, auxiliary broadcast services 
and private microwave services, each of which routinely carries private 
business or personal communications.”
70
 
The frequencies allocated under parts of the FCC rules in subsection 
2510(16)(E) partly overlap with the Wi-Fi operating frequencies.  As 
discussed in Part I, Wi-Fi networks divide their operating frequency bands 
into channels.  Only certain parts of the 802.11 protocol’s frequency range 
are allocated under the FCC rules, which means that communications over 
channel 11 and parts of channels 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the 802.11b protocol are 
covered under the protections of subsection 2510(16)(E).
71
  Channel 11 is 
the only commonly used 802.11b protocol channel that may be fully 
protected under subsection 2510(16)(E).
72
  Any electronic communications 
transmitted over channel 11 of the 802.11b, 802.11g, or 802.11n Wi-Fi 
networks might not be considered “readily accessible to the general 
public,” meaning such communications could still violate the FWA.  
Similarly, only certain channels of the 802.11a networks are covered by 
subsection 2510(16)(E) and could still be protected from interception under 
the FWA.
73
  However, practically, the privacy protections found in 
subsection 2510(16)(E) are limited because the interception must be found 
on the exact channels discussed above. 
Admittedly, while these frequencies are used by Wi-Fi 
communications, they were mostly discussed in the context of radio 
 
 70.  S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 15 (1986). 
 71.  The operating frequency range 2400—2495 MHz of the 802.11b, g, n protocols 
overlaps with the frequency bands 2450—2467, 2467—2483.5 allocated under the FCC 
rules. 
 72.  Channels 1, 6, and 11 are the most commonly used channels in operating 802.11b 
Wi-Fi networks, but channels 1 and 6 are outside the frequency ranges of § 2510(16)(E). 
 73.  802.11a, which operates in the 5170-5815 MHz frequency range, uses twelve 
official channels.  Only the 5091—5250 MHz frequency range is allocated by the FCC 
under part 25 of its rules, which means that only communications over the channels 36, 40, 
44, and 48 of the 802.11a networks are covered by § 2510(16)(E). 
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  Yet the legislative history does not indicate that 
Congress intended to exclude unsecured Wi-Fi communications from the 
FWA’s protection.  The Senate Report accompanying subsection 
2510(16)(E) indicates that the Senate’s main concern was protecting 
“private business or personal communications,” without mention of 
whether these communications are encrypted or not.
75
  Without further 
clarification, it is unclear whether unsecured Wi-Fi communications are 
afforded protection.  However, as is, users will not be able to benefit from 
subsection 2510(16)(E)’s protections for two reasons: the unclear meaning 
of “with respect to a radio communication”
76
 and the uncertainty about 
whether 2510(16)(E)’s protections apply to Wi-Fi communications.  
Furthermore, users may not benefit because of the need for a 
communication to be on a certain frequency or channel. 
2. Configuration 
The FWA’s “configuration” requirement must be satisfied for the 
exemption from the FWA’s protection to apply, assuming that unsecured 
Wi-Fi communications are determined to be “readily accessible to the 
general public.”  Subsection 2511(2)(g)(i) states that it is legal to intercept 
“electronic communication made through an electronic communication 
system that is configured so that such electronic communication is readily 
accessible to the general public.”
77
  In making a configuration requirement, 
a user  knowingly allows or disallows access to his communications. 
Neither the FWA nor the Senate Report elaborates on whether a 
system needs to be configured by the user himself to fall under the “readily 
accessible to the general public” exception or whether a default open 
network configuration deprives the user of privacy protection.  If the 
exception requires an affirmative choice in configuration by the user, then a 
user who has simply acquiesced in the default setting might be protected 
under the act.  If the exception does not require a choice in configuration, 
then a user who has acquiesced in the default setting might not be 
protected.  
Even if a user is operating on an open network, the user’s private 
 
 74.  See 47 C.F.R. 94 (2010) (discussing 47 C.F.R. 94 (2010)’s point 24 regarding 
personal communication services and point 74 regarding experimental radio, auxiliary, 
special broadcast and other program distributional services); 47 C.F.R. 94 (1995) (detailing 
point 94 and its treatment of private-operational–fixed microwave service). 
 75.  See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 15 (1986) (“These communications include satellite 
communications, auxiliary broadcast services and private microwave services, each of 
which routinely carries private business or personal communications.”). 
 76.  18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) (2006) 
 77.  18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (2006). 
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communications are probably not intended to be public communications.  
The Senate Report noted that “[t]he term ‘configure’ is intended to 
establish an objective standard of design configuration for determining 
whether a system receives privacy protection.”
78
  This language suggests 
that if the electronic communications system enables what users consider 
private communications, then such communications may protected under 
the FWA.  For example, a home Wi-Fi network is not necessarily designed 
to provide public communications.  Some users may choose to enable their 
system for public access.  In that instance, the focus is on “access,” not 
whether the communications themselves are public.  Similarly, a public 
Wi-Fi hotspot at a local coffee shop is enabled to provide public access to a 




Although the case law dealing with the “configuration” issue is sparse, 
United States v. Ahrdnt
80
 sheds some light on how courts are approaching 
the issue.  In this case, the defendant had operated on an unsecured Wi-Fi 
network at his home and had his iTunes
81
 program configured to publicly 
share his video library, including a collection of child pornography.  A 
police officer accessed some of these files using the defendant’s unsecured 
Wi-Fi network.  The district court held that since the wireless network and 
iTunes software were configured to allow general public access, the police 
officer lawfully accessed the defendant’s files under the FWA.
82
  The court 
came to this conclusion even though operating the Wi-Fi network as 
“open” did not require any positive action by the defendant.  However, 
since the default factory configuration of the wireless router was to operate 
in an unsecured mode, sharing an iTunes library did require positive action 
by the defendant.  The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, setting out 
three areas for further fact finding:
83
 (1) whether file sharing over a 
wireless network can be characterized as a “broadcast” of the contents of 
those files; (2) whether the defendant intentionally enabled sharing of his 
files over his wireless network; and (3) whether the accessed images were 
accessible via the Internet at that time or any time prior.
84
  With regard to 
the first question, “broadcast” does not fall under the FWA, but rather the 
 
 78.  S. REP. NO. 99–541, at 18 (1986). 
 79.  See, e.g., Dangers of Free Public WiFi, CBS News, July 8, 2010, available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/dangers-of-free-public-wifi/. 
 80.  475 Fed. App. 656 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 81.  iTunes is a software application that lets users purchase, play, and organize digital 
music and video on their computers and other mobile devices. What is iTunes?, ITUNES, 
http://www.apple.com/itunes/what-is/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2012). 
 82.  See Ahrdnt, 475 Fed. App.,at 657. 
83.   Id. at 656. 
84.   Id. at 658. 
WONG_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/3/2014  11:47 AM 
2013] EXPANDING PROTECTION OF WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS 115 
 
CA.  The second question focuses on whether the defendant himself took a 
positive action by sharing his files instead of just enabling access to them. 
Although this second question concerns access to files, an analogy can be 
made to whether a user actively allowed access to a personal Wi-Fi 
network.  Perhaps “configuration” can be determined based on a user’s 
actual actions, instead of the configuration of a manufacturer’s actions in 
configuring a default setting.  The third question is not directly applicable 
to this analysis. 
3. Case Law 
There have not been many cases that have dealt with the issue of 
whether unsecured Wi-Fi communications are protected under the FWA.  
The two cases existing to date have reached opposite conclusions. 
a. Cases Involving Google 
In the first of the cases to rule on intercepting unsecured Wi-Fi 
communications, In re Google Inc. Street View Electronic Communications 
Litigation, the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California chose not to apply subsection 2510(16)’s definition of “readily 
accessible to the general public” to Wi-Fi communications.
85
  The court 
construed the term “radio communication” narrowly to include only 
“traditional radio services,” such as “public-directed radio broadcast 
communication.”
86
  Since the FWA defined “electronic communication,” 
but not “radio communication,” the court, relying on legislative history,  
found that Congress added the definition in subsection 2510(16) to 
alleviate radio hobbyists’ concerns and to clarify that “intercepting 
traditional radio services is not unlawful.”
87
  The court further reasoned that 
the 2510(16) exceptions were “drafted for the particular technology of 
traditional radio broadcast mediums and do not address any broader radio-
based communications technology.”
88
  Essentially, the court found that 
even though Wi-Fi networks do transmit data using radio waves, “Congress 
did not intend Section 2510(16)’s narrow definition of ‘readily accessible 
to the general public’ to apply for purposes” of subsection 2511(2)(g)(i)’s 
 
 85.  In November 2013, Google settled these cases by agreeing to pay $17 million to 37 
states and the District of Columbia. Claire Miller, Google to Pay $17 Million to Settle 
Privacy Case, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 18, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/19/technology/google-to-pay-17-million-to-settle-
privacy-case.html?hpw&rref=technology. 
 86.  In re Google Inc., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (2011) 
 87.  Id. at 1079 (quoting 132 Cong. Rec. 14,601 (1986)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 88.  Id. at 1080. 
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exception to liability for intercepting all electronic communications.
89
  The 
court also noted that the data transmitted and collected by Google “w[as] 
not readable by the general public without the use of sophisticated packet 
sniffer technology.”
90
  Thus, these communications were not designed or 
intended to be public.
91
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in Joffe v. 
Google, Inc., ruling that Google’s data collection did not fall within the 
“readily accessible to the general public” exception within the FWA.
92
  The 
court further held that data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is not a “radio 
communication” as defined in the FWA, since the technical definition does 
not conform to the common understanding held by the enacting Congress.
93
  
The court found that “radio communication” usually does not encompass 
technologies like satellite television and thus should not encompass other 
types of technology like Wi-Fi communications that do not fit in the 
traditional radio technologies.
94
  In its analysis, the court looks at the 
possible interpretations of the terms “radio communication” and “electronic 
communication,” and whether one is a subset of the other.
95
  Congress’s 
enactment and repeal of § 2510(16)(F) offers little guidance.
96
 
b. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation 
In contrast to In re Google, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois in In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent 
Litig. ruled that the FWA did not prohibit the interception of 
communications sent over unsecured Wi-Fi networks provided by various 
commercial entities.
97
  This case was an infringement suit in which 
Innovatio accused various commercial entities that provide Wi-Fi to their 
customers of violating its patents in Wi-Fi technology.
98
  To gather 
evidence of the defendants’ alleged infringement, Innovatio used 
“commercially available Wi-Fi network analyzers” to intercept data.
99
  
Concerned that its activities might violate the FWA, Innovatio sought a 
 
 89.  Id. at 1081. 
 90.  Id. at 1082. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Joffe v. Google, Inc., No. 11-17483, slip op. at 12 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 2013). 
 93.  Id. at 13. 
 94.  Id. at 15. 
 95.  Id. at 31. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  886 F. Supp. 2d 888, 894 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
 98.  Id. at 889. 
 99.  Id. at 890. 
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preliminary ruling on the admissibility of the evidence it obtained.
100
 
The court distinguished In re Google, noting how that decision was 
based in part on the fact that the plaintiffs had alleged that their 
communications were not readable by the general public without the use of 
sophisticated packet sniffing technology, a proposition that the court 
accepted as true under the standards applicable to a motion to dismiss.
101
  
The court in In re Innovatio was not held to accept such an allegation and 
ruled that Innovatio’s collection activities did not violate the FWA, per 
subsection 2511(2)(g)(i), because the Wi-Fi technology Innovatio used is 
readily accessible to the general public.
102
  This technology “is available to 




In re Innovatio seems to suggest that “readily accessible to the general 
public” can be fulfilled by the technology itself being accessible to the 
public at a local store.
104
  This adds another dimension to the debate over 
public networks versus private communications. 
B. The Communications Act 
In 1934, Congress enacted the CA.  The precise scope of subsection 
605(a) of the CA was difficult to determine, since the language used to 
regulate a new technology, telephones, was more appropriate for an older 
and well-understood technology, telegraphs.  The problems with subsection 
605 were widely recognized at the time of its enactment and debates 
centered on amending the CA gradually shifted to calling for entirely new 
legislation.  In 1968, Congress amended the CA to cross-reference the 
FWA, which had been enacted in 1968 as well.  The first sentence of 
subsection 605(a) prohibits certain conduct “[e]xcept as authorized by [the 
FWA].”  Subsection 605(a) governs unauthorized publication or use of 
communications,
105
 the provisions of which are as follows: 
 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 893. 
 102.  Id. at 894. 
 103.  Id. at 893. 
 104.  Subsequent cases at the district level have not ruled directly on the issue of what is 
“readily accessible to the general public.”  See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent 
Litig., No. 11-C-9308, 2013 WL 3874042 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2013) (holding that the patent 
claims were essential to the implementation of wireless standards proposed by professional 
organizations); In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F.Supp.2d. at 922 
(holding that the licensing campaign was protected as petitioning activity under the First 
Amendment and Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, and the manufacturers stated a breach of 
contract claim against the patent owner). 
 105.  47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (2006). 
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[N]o person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept 
any radio communication and divulge or publish the existence, 
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such 
intercepted communication to any person. No person not being 
entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any interstate 
or foreign communication by radio and use such communication 
(or any information therein contained) for his own benefit or for 
the benefit of another not entitled thereto.
106
 
The passage of the FWA transferred “regulation of the interception of wire 
or oral communications” from the CA to the new FWA.
107
  The FWA 
outlined a comprehensive scheme of the conditions under which such 
communications could be intercepted, disclosed, or used without incurring 
criminal or civil penalties.
108
 
The Senate Report stated that subsection 605(a) was “not intended to 
apply to radio broadcasts or transmission by amateurs or others for the use 
of the general public.”
109
  There currently is no FCC precedent in 
addressing the application of subsection 605(a) to Wi-Fi communications.  
Likewise, the courts have not explicitly ruled on such communications, 
though there is some case law on interception of oral communications.  In 
United States v. Rose,
110
 the First Circuit concluded that in amending 
subsection 605 to cross-reference the FWA, Congress incorporated an 
expectation of privacy in subsection 605.
111
  The court recognized, 
however, that incorporating subjective and reasonable objectives would 
diminish subsection 605’s protection.
112
  This expectation of privacy will be 
addressed below. 
III. EXPECTATIONS IN PROTECTING UNSECURED WI-FI 
COMMUNICATIONS 
A fork in the analysis occurs in determining how to protect Wi-Fi 
communications based on the interaction between the FWA and CA.  If 
unsecured Wi-Fi communications are determined to be readily accessible, 
meaning that they do not fall under the exceptions in subsection 2510(16), 
then these communications would not be protected.  This exemption means 
that unsecured Wi-Fi communications can be intercepted lawfully per 
subsection 2511(2)(g)(i).  Thus we move to subsection 605(a) of the CA to 
 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 107 (1968). 
 108.  18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2006). 
 109.  S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 108 (1968). 
 110.  660 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1982). 
 111.  Id. at 27. 
 112.  Id. 
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seek protection for such communications.  However, as mentioned above, 
there have not been any applications of subsection 605(a) to Wi-Fi 
communications.  Congress also seemed to have transferred regulation of 
interceptions to the FWA.
113
 
If, however, unsecured Wi-Fi communications are not readily 
accessible, which means that they fall under an exception in subsection 
2510(16), then such communications would be protected and subsection 
605(a) of the CA need not apply. 
While the FWA and CA, both individually and as read together, are 
unclear in how they protect Wi-Fi communications, it is worth looking to 
non-statutory expectations of privacy with regard to such communications. 
A. User Expectations 
Privacy is determined by the individual’s intent to preserve his 
privacy, even in an area accessible by the public.
114
  Users presumably have 
an expectation of privacy
115
 with regard to their Internet communications 
regardless of whether they are operating on a secure
116
 or unsecure 
network.  This expectation stems from a lack of appreciation about the risks 
associated with operating on an unsecure network, which itself  stems from 
not fully understanding the technology.  The data transmitted over an 
unsecured Wi-Fi network can still be intercepted unless the data itself is 
encrypted.
117
  Individuals are increasingly using Wi-Fi hotspots since many 
public spaces are being equipped with such systems.  Users also “mooch” 
their neighbors’ Wi-Fi when convenient.
118
  Although an individual may 
 
 113.  See supra Part II.B (discussing transferring regulation duties). 
 114.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding that even though a phone 
booth was normally a public place, the act of making a private call turned it into a private 
one). 
 115.  To be clear, this paper is not suggesting a different interpretation of the FWA based 
on users’ expectations because, after all, the statutory language is “readily accessible to the 
general public” and not “communications that the general public knows are readily available 
to the general public.”  See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 886 F. Supp. 2d 
888 (2012) (distinguishing accessibility of networks generally and the electronic 
communications sent over them). 
 116.  Amongst expert radio scanners, encryption was a proxy for the transmitter’s 
expectation of privacy.  This expectation cannot necessarily be so clearly applied to other 
devices that have broadcast capability.  Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Hearings 
on H.R. 3378 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of 
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. at 169-70. 
 117.  Configuring Network Data Encrypting, CISCO, 
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/11_3/security/configuration/guide/scencryp.html#wp
4667 (last visited Jan. 4, 2013). 
 118.  A recent survey found that 32 percent of respondents admitted to using their 
neighbors’ unsecured Wi-Fi networks.  Byron Acohido, Survey: 32% Admit Mooching 
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consciously realize that he is operating on a public network, he still expects 
that there will be no interception of his private communications as 
discussed in Part II.A.2. 
Users could theoretically choose to take extra security measures by 
only operating on secure Wi-Fi networks or using tools like those 
mentioned in Part I such as installing firewalls, using VPN, HTTPS, and 
SSL.  Practically, however, implementation of such features may be too 
difficult for the average user to understand and effectively use.  Since such 
settings are not generally the default enabled by the equipment 
manufacturers, users may have a false sense of security when operating on 
an open Wi-Fi network.
119
 
The seemingly pervasive availability of public hotspots, whether free 
or commercial, adds to this false sense of security.  Many free public 
hotspots leave their networks “open” and do not require users to 
authenticate before using their network.
120
  Setting up a secure Wi-Fi 
network may be difficult and may hamper accessibility
121
 by requiring 
credentials to log onto the network.  Even if an authentication mechanism 
is enabled, the data transmitted between the wireless router and a users’ 
device still might not be secure.  Some Wi-Fi hotspots use software 
authentication applications that can implement the WEP (wired equivalent 
privacy) security scheme to encrypt individual users’ data, but this has 
proven to be ineffective to protect against interception by users of the same 
Wi-Fi network.
122
  Some commercial hotspot providers that require 
payment explicitly will advise their customers to use other encryption 
mechanisms.
123
  Users tend to have a sense of security in using all these 
 
Neighbor’s Wi-Fi, USA TODAY,(Feb. 4, 2011,), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2011-02-04-wifimoochers04_ST_N.htm (finding 
that 32 percent of survey respondents admitted to using their neighbors’ unsecured Wi-Fi 
networks). 
 119.  See, e.g., Predreg Klasnja et al., “When I Am on Wi-Fi, I am Fearless”: Privacy 
Concerns & Practices in Everyday Wi-Fi Use, in CHI ‘09 PROC. 27TH INT’L CONF. (2009), 
available at http://appanalysis.org/jjung/jaeyeon-pub/FormativeUserStudy4CHI.pdf 
(reporting the results of a study involving eleven participants and concluding that users from 
the general public “were largely unaware of . . . the visibility of unencrypted 
communications,” which “led them to a false sense of security that reduced how much they 
thought about privacy and security while using Wi-Fi”). 
 120.  See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 31 (discussing open networks). 
 121.  Barnes & Noble, for example, seeks to make their stores feel like home by 
providing no-hassle Internet connection.  AT&T Wi-Fi in B&N Stores, BARNES & NOBLE, 
http://www.barnesandnoble.com/u/Wi-fi-at-Barnes-and-Noble/379001240/ (last visited Jan. 
4, 2013). 
 122.  Adrian Hannah, Packet Sniffing Basics, LINUX JOURNAL (Nov. 14, 2011), 
http://www.linuxjournal.com/content/packet-sniffing-basics. 
 123.  See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, BOINGO WIRELESS, 
http://www.boingo.com/boingo-faq.php (last visited Jan. 4, 2012). 
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hotspot providers because so many other people continue to use (and 
sometimes pay) for this network access. 
1. Looking at the History of Cordless Phone Conversations 
Courts initially had refused to recognize an expectation of privacy in 
cordless phone conversations because there was no explicit reference to the 
monitoring of radio transmissions in the original enactment of the FWA.
124
  
In 1994, Congress amended the FWA to prohibit the interception of 
cordless phone communications.
125
  How courts have treated expectations 
of privacy with respect to cordless phone conversations in the absence of 
explicit statutes could be helpful in determining what privacy users should 
expect with regard to unsecured Wi-Fi communications.  Currently there is 
no explicit statute protecting such Wi-Fi communications, which leaves 
unclear the status of protecting such communications, much in the same 
way that cellphones were once treated. 
Another reason why courts refused to recognize an expectation of 
privacy in cordless phone conversations as reasonable is because such 
conversations “could be intercepted easily with readily available 
technology, such as AM radio.”
126
  After cordless phone technology 
improved to make such interceptions more difficult, Congress amended the 
FWA to extend protection to cordless phone conversations that could no 
longer be analogized to AM/FM radio transmissions.
127
  In the case of Wi-
Fi communications, some intercepting mechanisms require a level of 
expertise, but others do not.
128
  The movement to educate users about Wi-Fi 
communications could spur development on the other side of better 
interception technologies, which supports the case that such technology is 
not “in general public use” and that such users should receive protection. 
B. Comparable Fourth Amendment Analysis 
While the Fourth Amendment doctrine only applies to government 
 
 124.  Price v. Turner, 260 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-541, 
at 12) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 125.  18 U.S.C. § 2510(1), (12)(A) (2006). 
 126.  Price, 260 F.3d at 1148 (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 12) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  There are some tools that an average user could figure out, such as Firesheep, that 
allows anyone to effectively hack into various accounts.  However, other “hacking” tools 
may require some expertise.  See, e.g., Jared Howe, A Hacker’s Toolkit, PRIVATE WIFI, 
http://www.privatewifi.com/a-hacker%E2%80%99s-toolkit/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2013) 
(discussing complex hacking tools that require expertise). 
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searches and courts have found that it provides little privacy protection to 
technological information exposed to the public,
129
 a brief analysis provides 
further context into what a reasonable expectation of privacy is.  The 
Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.”
130
  A two-prong test is used to determine if a piece of 
information merits Fourth Amendment protection.
131
  The first prong 
requires that the individual have a subjective expectation of privacy, and 
the second prong requires that society is willing to recognize that 
expectation as reasonable, which is an objective criterion.
132
 
Thus far, courts have only read a reasonable expectation of privacy 
that conforms to Fourth Amendment law for “oral communications” under 
the ECPA.
133
  The statute defines “oral communication” as “any 
communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such 
communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying 
such expectation.”
134
  The definition of “electronic communications” does 
not have any similar language suggesting an “expectation” of privacy, 
which seems to imply that Congress meant to afford less protection to 
electronic communications than oral communications.
135
  However, the 
ECPA was enacted at a time when the Internet was in its infancy and not 
accessible to the general public..  A Fourth Amendment reasonable 
expectation of privacy analysis can still be conducted to provide a basis for 
users’ expectations for their Wi-Fi communications. 
The first prong for determining Fourth Amendment protection should 
be easily satisfied because users expect their Wi-Fi communications will be 
private, without even really considering if they are working on a secure or 
unsecure network.  The second prong should be relatively easy to satisfy as 
 
 129.  See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(distinguishing between the content of electronic communications and non-content 
information); Freedman v. Am. Online, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 174, 181 (D. Conn. 2005) 
(distinguishing public information from the content of electronic communications) . 
 130.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 131.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361-62 (1967). 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Kee v. City of Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206, 213–214 (5th Cir. 2001).  The Supreme 
Court has declined to answer directly the question of if a reasonable expectation of privacy 
exists in electronic communications.  Hector Gonzalez, James McGuire and Rebecca Kahan, 
Do Privacy Rights in Electronic Communications Exist? (N.Y. L.J.), Jan. 17, 2012, 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202538187981&Do_Privacy_R
ights_in_Electronic_Communications_Exist&slreturn=20130305104853. 
 134.  18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2006). 
 135.  18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2006); Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in 
Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1582-84 (2004). 
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well, as society would expect that users would like to keep their email 
passwords, browsing history, etc. private.  A “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” under the Fourth Amendment would prevent the police from 
intercepting such communications without a warrant.  . 
In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court applied the “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” test to modern technology, ruling that the use of a 
thermal imaging device from a public vantage point to monitor the 
radiation of heat from a person’s home was a “search” within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment.
136
  Intercepting Wi-Fi communications from an 
unsecured network could be thought of as monitoring radio waves 
emanating from the home.  In Kyllo, the Court held that to use 
“technology . . . not in general public use” to gain information that could 
not be obtained except by actually entering the home is a Fourth 
Amendment search.
137
  In referring to technology that is not in “general 
public use,” the Court was essentially applying the objective prong of the 
Katz test, where society recognizes this expectation of privacy as 
reasonable.
138
  Whether this ruling is applicable to intercepting private Wi-
Fi communications on an unsecured network depends in part on the state of 
the technology. 
1. Password Protection 
While courts have given less Fourth Amendment protection to 
wireless communications, they have determined that people have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy when they have enabled password 
protection.  In United States v. Heckenkemp, the Ninth Circuit held that a 
student had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer’s files 
despite having used the computer to hack into the university’s email system 
because the files were password protected.
139
  This expectation of privacy 
will not be upheld if a person shares the password with others.  In United 
States v. D’Andrea, the defendant and her boyfriend allegedly sexually 
abused the defendant’s eight-year-old daughter and posted pictures of the 
abuse on a password-protected site.
140
  The United States District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts held that although password protection gives 
a reasonable expectation of privacy, sharing the password meant the 
defendant assumed the risk that the password would be shared.
141
  In 
 
 136.  533 U.S. 26, 40 (2001). 
 137.  Id. at 34. 
 138.  Id. at 33. 
 139.  482 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 140.  497 F. Supp. 2d 117, 118 (D. Mass. 2007). 
 141.  Id. at 123. 
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Casella v. Borders, the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Virginia found that the absence of a password was a reason to find that 
there was no expectation of privacy in the digital files on a phone.
142
 
A distinguishing feature of unsecured Wi-Fi networks from the 
password protected files in the above-mentioned Fourth Amendment case 
law is that the system itself does not have a password, but the 
communications can still be subject to an expectation of privacy.  Users do 
not necessarily have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their network in 
that people seemingly do not mind sharing a network with others, as 
demonstrated by the increased use of public hotspots.  However, users 
seem to have an expectation that the communications on such a network 
would not be intercepted.
143
 
IV. AMENDING THE FEDERAL WIRETAP ACT 
The statutory interpretation of the FWA is too uncertain to determine 
reliably if unsecured Wi-Fi communications are protected.
144
  Given that 
the FWA is the predominant law in protecting the privacy of electronic 
communications, the statute should be amended to expressly address 
concerns about Wi-Fi communications.  The FWA was amended in 1986 to 
account for improved technology, at a time when wireless communications 
were far from the norm and individuals used dial-up modems to connect to 
the Internet.  The FWA now is too unwieldy and unreliable as a law 
enforcement tool, and it is difficult for judges and investigators to apply.
145
  
While the Ninth Circuit took a step in its recent Joffe decision in ruling that 
“radio communication” should be given its ordinary meaning,
146
 this still 
leaves the exact boundaries of protection for “electronic communications” 
unclear.  Now is an appropriate time to revisit the FWA to account for the 
technological improvements of the last few decades.  There have been 
hearings in both the House and the Senate,
147
 and several new bills were 
 
 142.  649 F. Supp. 2d 435, 439 (W.D. Va. 2009). 
 143.  See supra Part III.A (arguing that public network users expect privacy of private 
messages). 
 144.  This paper will not analyze amending the CA, since the focus of conflicting 
statutory interpretation surrounds the FWA.  Note that Congress transferred regulation of 
such communications to the FWA.  Supra Part II.B. 
 145.  Even in 1994, the Fifth Circuit was already calling the FWA “famous (if not 
infamous) for its lack of clarity . . . .”  Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret 
Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 146.  Joffe v. Google, Inc., No. 11-17483, slip op. at 17 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 2013). 
 147.  See Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Government Perspectives on 
Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
112th Cong. 130 (2011) (addressing new concerns of user privacy); ECPA Reform and the 
Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Services: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
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introduced in response to concerns raised by industry and privacy groups.
148
 
Given that there is conflicting case law on how to categorize 
unsecured Wi-Fi communications, it is Congress’s job to step in and 
clarify.  Congress possesses a comparative advantage over the courts in 
crafting effective policy through its ability to legislate.  This advantage is 
particularly acute in the area of new and emerging technology.  Where 
Congress can create comprehensive and prospective policy regimes from 
scratch, the Supreme Court must address issues of privacy on a case-by-
case basis, making the judicial system incapable of addressing privacy 
problems involving technological advancements until issues arise.  Even 
then, the court is constrained by the specific facts of a case.
149
  In trying to 
address new technology issues, the Supreme Court has made hasty, and 
sometimes improper, decisions, prompting Congress to react with 
legislation.  For example, in Olmstead v. United States,
150
 the Supreme 
Court initially held that an individual has no expectation of privacy in 
communications conducted over telephone wires under the Fourth 




Removing the uncertainties surrounding Wi-Fi communications 
protections in the statutory language allows for users to better protect 
themselves under clearly defined regulations.  Such clarity also allows for 
Wi-Fi technology to continue developing,
152
 especially in an economy 
where users are becoming more and more dependent on exchanges of 
information.
153
  One of the issues that Congress needs to address is whether 
unsecured Wi-Fi communications are “readily accessible to the general 
public,” that is, do such communications fall under the exceptions of 
subsection 2510(16), thereby entitling them to protection under the FWA.  
In re Innovatio suggests that “readily accessible to the general public” is an 
 
the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. 81, 85, 93-94 (2010) (statement of Stephen Wm. Smith, United States Magistrate 
Judge) (discussing privacy concerns of user data); Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties 
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 29 (2010) (statement of Albert Gidari, 
Partner, Perkins Coie LLP) (discussing user privacy concerns of user data). 
 148.  See S. 1212, 112th Cong. (2011) (discussing privacy of geolocation data); H.R. 
2168, 112th Cong. (2011) (geolocation data privacy); S. 1011, 112th Cong. (2011) 
(discussing privacy of electronic communications). 
 149.  See Greely, supra note 44 (discussing how the Supreme Court addresses new 
technology problems on a case-by-case basis). 
 150.  277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 151.  47 U.S.C. § 151-609 (2006). 
 152.  See, e.g., supra notes 29 and 30 (differentiating WEP from WPA and discussing 
new technology). 
 153.  HARRY HENDERSON, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 15 (rev. ed. 2006). 
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issue of cost,practicality, and availability in whether an average user could 
simply buy a device to intercept communications.  Congress could 
strengthen the intent element by requiring a user to have affirmatively 
configured his or her device to allow members of the public to monitor the 
communications in order to meet the “readily accessible to the general 
public” exception.
154
  Note that the FWA already has a strong “intent” 
requirement in another area, preventing any accidental interceptions from 
resulting in liability.
155
  Another issue that Congress needs to resolve is 
whether “readily accessible to the general public” applies to electronic 
communications (the data transmitted, email passwords, browsing history, 
etc.) or to the electronic system (having a secure or unsecure Wi-Fi 
network). 
Educating users may be the long-term solution in protecting data 
privacy over Wi-Fi networks, since many of Congress’s actions may again 
become outdated.  As mentioned above, there seems to have been an 
increase in the promotion of network education with many articles 
available on the Internet explaining the step-by-step processes of setting up 
various security mechanisms.  Such “education” has not definitively 
decreased instances of interception.  Even after users have been educated, 
more sophisticated intercepting or hacking technology may be developed.  
Legislation to clearly protect all Wi-Fi communications decreases the gap 
between users’ hypothetical ability to protect themselves and practical 
realities of doing so. 
While new regulations and definitions are needed, it is important not 
to overregulate.  Interception of unsecured Wi-Fi communications should 
not necessarily be completely illegal.  System administrators should be able 
to regulate their own networks to detect any hacking attempts or 
inappropriate traffic on their networks.  Such administrative activities 
should be allowed by having clear carve-out exemptions from liability.  
The FWA already contains two important exceptions and a carve-out.  
First, consent immediately removes a subject from the statute’s 
protections.
156
  A second exception allows communications service 
providers “to intercept, disclose, or use . . .” the communication in question 
“in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity 
which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the 




 154.  See generally Part II.A.2 (discussing configuration requirement for exemption of 
FWA protection). 
 155.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2006) (stating guidelines for default open network 
configurations). 
 156.  18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (2006). 
 157.  18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2006). 
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An additional carve-out limits the reach of the statute.  In the case of 
criminal activity, a service provider is authorized to provide intercepted 
communications to the appropriate authorities.
158
 
Extending protections to unsecured Wi-Fi communications could 
arguably expand the reach of federal power if the stance is taken that the 
current act does not cover such communications, where users could instead 
protect themselves by enabling the security features on their own Wi-Fi 
networks or avoiding using unsecured public Wi-Fi networks.  Presumably, 
the general public did not realize that interceptions of the magnitude by 
those like Google were possible.  Furthermore, legal protections can bridge 
the gap in protecting users’ privacy until limitations in technology and 
consumer awareness can be overcome. 
In amending the FWA, a sunset provision could be included to 
alleviate concerns about federal overreach and account for progressing 
technology that could render a present amendment to later become 
obsolete.  Congress could require the FCC or a similarly technically 
competent body to submit periodic reports on the status of Wi-Fi 
technology and the evolving need for privacy protections. 
CONCLUSION 
That two courts would have opposite rulings on what “readily 
accessible to the general public” means and differing analysis to reach their 
respective results is evidence that Congress needs amend and clarify the 
protections afforded to unsecured Wi-Fi communications.  The current 
electronic privacy laws, including the CA, provide for an unclear roadmap 
in how to analyze such possible protections. 
As our society becomes increasingly dependent on using Wi-Fi 
communications for various aspects of our lives, there is a parallel 
expectation of privacy.  The fact that users do not fully understand Wi-Fi 
technology and the shortcomings of current security mechanisms is not a 
justification to violate their privacy, but instead is a call to Congress to 
amend the FWA to reflect their reasonable expectations.  Clear statutory 
protections will allow for the continued progression of Wi-Fi technology.  
Society’s dependency on Wi-Fi networks and public hotspots both 
economically and personally requires expansion of the FWA to ensure 
national uniformity.  Leaving these decisions to judicial discretion has 




 158.  18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(b)(iv) (2006). 
